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INTRODUCTION 
The Berne Convention, the premier international copyright 
treaty, was first signed in 1886} The impetus for the treaty came from 
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I. Berne Convention as used in this Article refers collectively to the 1886 Treaty and 
its subsequent revisions, which include the following: Convention for the Creation of an 
Intellectual Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 168 
Consol. T.S. 185 [hereinafter Berne Convention of 1886]; Additional Act and Interpretative 
Declaration Modifying the International Copyright Convention, May 4, 1896, 182 Consol. 
T.S. 441 [hereinafter Paris Revision of 1896]; International Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Nov. 13, 1908, 1 L.N.T.S. 217 [hereinafter Ber­
lin Revision of 1908]; Additional Protocol to the International Copyright Convention, 
March 20, 1914, 1 L.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter Additional Protocol of 1914]; Convention of 
Berne for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, June 2, 1928, 123 L.N.T.S. 235 
[hereinafter Rome Revision of 1928]; Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works, June 26, 1948, 331 U.N.T.S. 217 [hereinafter Brussels Revision of 1948]; 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 14, 1967, 828 
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European, and especially French authors, who saw pirated versions of 
their works appear again and again in foreign countries without the 
author's permission and without compensation for the author.2 Arti­
cle 1 of the treaty, retained in all subsequent versions, explicitly states, 
"The countries to which this Convention applies constitute a Union 
for the protection of the rights of authors in their literary and artistic 
works."3 Ten nations signed the treaty in 1886 at Berne.4 The mem­
bers of the Berne Union havt< revised or amended the Convention 
seven times, most recently at Paris in 1971.S Eighty-five nations have 
ratified or acceded to some version or versions of the treaty. 6 
With each revision, the Berne Union has increased the level of 
protection for authors required of member states. 7 With few excep­
tions, the treaty requires that member nations grant the same rights to 
authors of other member nations as they do to their own nationals. 8 
Thus, membership in the Berne Union provides a nation's authors and 
artists with great protection in other member countries. 
For many years the United States resisted pressure to join the 
Berne Union, mostly because copyright protection in this country fell 
below the minimum level required in the Berne Convention in several 
key respects. First, the Berne Convention does not allow member na­
tions to make copyright protection contingent upon any formality.9 
This provision of the treaty created perhaps the greatest obstacle to 
the United States' adherence to the Berne Convention: Congressional 
reluctance to give up the mandatory registration and notice provisions 
U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Stockholm Revision of 1967]; Berne Convention for the Protec­
tion of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24, 1971 [hereinafter Paris Revision of 1971], 
reprinted in 1971 COPYRIGHT 135, and reprinted in 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID 
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, al'p. 27 (1978), also in THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR 
THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS, at 235 (WIPO 1986). Hereinaf­
ter, all references to the Berne Convention refer to the Paris Revision of 1971 unless other­
wise specified. 
2. For a complete discussion of the history of the Berne Convention, see Arpad 
Bogsch, The First Hundred Years ofthe Berne Convention for the Protection ofLiterary and 
Artistic Works, in THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND 
ARTISTIC WORKS 11 (WIPO 1986). 
3. See Paris Revision of 1971, supra note 1, art. l. 
4. 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 16.7 (1989). The ten countries were Belgium, 
France, Germany, Great Britain, Haiti, Italy, Liberia, Spain, Switzerland, and Tunisia. 
Bogsch, supra note 2, at 19. 
5. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, § 16.7; see also Bogsch, supra note 2, at 19-25. 
6. See 4 NIMMER, supra note 1, app. 22 (providing a list of all member countries and 
the status of their ratification). 
7. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, § 16.7. 
8. Id. 
9. Paris Revision of 1971, supra note 1, art. 5, para. 2. 
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that had been a salient feature of American copyright law since 
1909.10 In addition, many argued that American copyright law did 
not adequately protect the applied arts, as the Berne Convention also 
requires. I I Finally, experts on copyright law disagreed as to whether 
American law protected authors' moral rights in their works, which 
the Berne Convention explicitly requires. 12 
Moral rights pertain to an author's right to claim and control his 
or her own work, rather than any right to be compensated. 13 Article 
6bis of the Berne Convention describes the rights protected as, "the 
right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, 
mutilation, or other modification of, or other derogatory action in re­
lation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or 
reputation."14 The treaty requires that these rights be unalienable 
from the author, regardless of whether he or she retains ownership of 
the work in question. IS This is in contrast to economic rights, which 
adhere in the work, not the author, and which pass to the owner upon 
transfer. 16 Several revisions of the Berne Convention have increased 
the minimum protection of moral rights required of member nations, 
although thus far the choice of means for ensuring this protection has 
been left to the individual member nations.J7 
The concept of unalienable, noneconomic rights in artistic works 
is foreign to American copyright law, and indeed to Anglo-American 
property law in general. In 1976, when Congress revised the Ameri­
can copyright statute for the first time in nearly seventy years, there 
were three schools of thought about American copyright law and the 
minimum protection of moral rights required under the Berne <:;on­
vention. Some argued that changes in American law were necessary in 
order to conform to the Berne Convention, and desirable. IS Others 
argued that such change was necessary to comply with the Berne Con­
10. See infra notes 163-66 and accompanying text. 
11. See infra notes 164-67 and accompanying text. 
12. Paris Revision of 1971, supra note 1, art. 6bis. For a discussion of the contro­
versy over whether U.S. protection of moral rights is adequate to meet the Berne Conven­
tion minimum requirements, see infra notes 182-220 and accompanying text. 
13. See, e.g., Russell J. DaSilva, Drait Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A Compari­
son of Artists' Rights in France and the United States, 28 BULL. CoPYRIGHT SOC'y 1 
(1980); Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, 
Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554 (1940); Dan Rosen, Artists' Moral Rights: A 
European Evolution, an American Revolution, 2 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 155 (1983). 
14. Paris Revision of 1971, supra note 1, art. 6bis. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. para. 3. 
18. See infra notes 169-75 and accompanying text. 
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vention, but undesirable, and that the United States should not adhere 
to the Berne Convention. 19 A third group argued that no change in 
American protection for moral rights was necessary in order to adhere 
to the Berne Convention.20 In the end, Congress chose not to revise 
the copyright law to comply with the Berne Convention. 
By 1987, however, the advantages of membership in the Berne 
Union had become too extensive to ignore, and Congress decided to 
accede to the Berne Convention.21 In the Berne Convention Imple­
mentation Act of 1988 ("BCIA"),22 Congress altered the copyright 
statutes in several respects. First, Congress did away with the 
mandatory notice and registration systems, making both procedures 
optional,23 In addition, Congress clarified the extent to which Ameri­
can copyright law protected applied art.24 After a debate similar to 
that which ensued in 1976, Congress chose not to amend American 
copyright law in order to provide greater protection for authors' moral 
rights.2s The BCIA also explicitly stated that the Berne Convention 
was not self-executing in the United States, and that rights provided 
under federal or state law "shall not be expanded or reduced by virtue 
of, or in reliance upon, the provisions of the Berne Convention, or the 
adherence of the United States thereto."26 Thus, although many legal 
experts argued that change in American copyright law's treatment of 
moral rights was both desirable in and of itself and necessary for ac­
cession to the Berne Union,27 the United States joined the Berne 
Union without providing any increased protection of moral rights. 
This Article will contrast the treatment of authors' moral rights 
in the United States with the approaches taken in France and by the 
Berne Convention. Protection of moral rights is clearly controversial 
19. See infra notes 169-75 and accompanying text. 
20. See infra notes 169-75 and accompanying text. 
21. For a detailed discussion of the long process of the United States' accession to the 
Berne Convention, see Peter Burger, The Berne Convention: Its History and Its Key Role in 
the Future, 3 J.L. & TECH. 1 (1988); Ralph Oman, The United States and the Berne Union: 
An Extended Courtship, 3 J.L. & TECH. 71 (1988). 
22. Pub. Law No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 17 U.S.c.). 
23. 17 U.S.C. §§ 401, 408(a) (1988). Registration is still required prior to filing an 
action for infringement of copyright in American works. 17 U.S.C. § 411. In addition, 
registration is, with one exception, a prerequisite to receiving statutory damages. 17 U.S. C. 
§ 412. Copyright notice provides the author with certain evidentiary presumptions. 17 
U.S.C. § 402(d). 
24. BCIA, supra note 22, sec. 4 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988». 
25. Id. sec. 3(b)(2) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Historical and Revision Notes) 
(1988». 
26. Id. sec. 4(3) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1000c) (1988». 
27. See, e.g., Oman, supra note 21, at 71. 
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in the United States, yet such protection is a central feature of copy­
right law.on the European continent, especially in France. This essen­
tial difference may become increasingly problematic for the United 
States as the Berne Convention moves toward uniformity of protection 
in its member countries, and toward greater protection for moral 
rights. This Article will focus in particular on the social and historical 
sources of this difference between American and French law. Section 
I will describe the development of copyright law in France, with its 
dual systems of economic and moral rights. Section II will briefly 
trace the history of the Berne Convention, focusing primarily on the 
Convention's growing concern with moral rights. Section III will dis­
cuss the history of Anglo-American copyright law, with its dual con­
cerns of remuneration for authors and public access to works. Section 
IV will discuss the sections of current American copyright law that 
afford some protection for moral rights. Section IV will also briefly 
discuss the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990,28 recently passed by 
Congress, and argue that recognition of a rationale for noneconomic 
rights in artistic works represents a significant change in American 
law, which may be incompatible with existing copyright law. The Ar­
ticle concludes that, given trends in the Berne Convention, the United 
States must move toward a different approach to copyright, with in­
creased emphasis on the rights of authors. 
I. FRENCH COPYRIGHT LAW 
French law recognizes two categories of rights in artistic works: 
pecuniary rights (droits patrimoniaux) and moral rights (droit 
moral ).29 Other nations on the European continent recognize moral 
rights as well.30 Recognition of moral rights is a relatively recent phe­
nomenon in French law, but this approach has led to a copyright sys­
tem that is much more protective of authors than is the Anglo­
American system. 
Prior to the French Revolution, copyright law in France was con­
cerned primarily with pecuniary rights. From the advent of the print­
ing press, only the sovereign could grant any rights in artistic works,3) 
28. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990) (to be codified in scattered sections of 
17 U.S.C,). 
29. Edward J. Damich, State "Moral Rights" Statutes: An Analysis and Critique, 13 
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 291,294-96 (1989) [hereinafter Damich I]; DaSilva, supra note 
13, at 3; Rosen, supra note 13, at 155-59. 
30. Rosen, supra note 13, at 156-58. 
31. Pierre Chesnais, France, in STEPHEN M. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL COpy­
RIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS 326 (1983). 
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and most often granted only an exclusive license to print a given work 
for a limited time. 32 This system continued until the early eighteenth 
century. The printing companies profited from their monopoly 
licenses, and the sovereign was able to exercise effective censorship by 
granting licenses to print only works of which it approved. 33 
From the early eighteenth century on, French legal scholars de­
bated the existence of an author's perpetual right to some interest in 
his or her work.34 Modem scholars disagree about the original source 
of this concern,35 but it did lead to an amendment to the licensing 
statute.36 In 1777, French law recognized an author's "privilege" to 
publish and receive the price of his or her work as distinct from a 
printer's right to recover his or her costS.37 
On August 4, 1789, soon after the French Revolution, the Con­
stituent Assembly abolished both authors' and printers' privileges. 38 
While the Assembly wanted to avoid establishing any system similar 
to that of the ancien regime, it did recognize the importance of pro­
tecting artistic endeavors.39 The Constituent Assembly passed two 
decrees concerning authors' rights. The first, in 1791, established 
guidelines for relations between authors and theaters.40 In a statement 
urging support for this decree, one member of the Constituent Assem­
bly argued, "The most sacred, the most unassailable, and ... the most 
personal of all properties is the work which is the fruit of a writer's 
mind; however, it is property of an entirely different nature."41 The 
second decree, passed in 1793, provided authors with a right of repro­
duction.42 With a few minor modifications, these two decrees were the 
basis of French copyright law until the codification of that law in 
1957.43 
Thus, the statutory origins of French copyright law were not con­
cerned with moral rights. While some pre-revolutionary French legal 
32. DaSilva, supra note 13, at 8. 
33. Chesnais, supra note 31, at 326-27. 
34. DaSilva, supra note 13, at 8-9. 
35. See Chesnais, supra note 31, at 326-27 (arguing that the advocacy of authors' 
rights came from provincial publishers, who were disadvantaged by the privilege system 
vis-d-vis Parisian publishers). But see DaSilva, supra note 13, at 8-9 (arguing that these 
discussions of authors' rights stemmed from early natural law thought). 
36. Chesnais, supra note 31, at 326. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. (citing Moniteur Universel of 15 January 1791 (statement of Le Chapelier». 
42. Id. at 327. 
43. Id. See also DaSilva, supra note 13, at 11. 
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scholars may have advocated a form of moral rights, the ancien re­
gime's licensing scheme was not substantially different in form or pur­
pose from the system in force in England at this time.44 Moreover, 
even after the French Revolution, the two decrees upon which copy­
right was based explicitly granted only pecuniary rights. Statutory au­
thority was not the source of the droit moral doctrine. 
Instead, protection of moral rights developed in French judicial 
decisions.45 These decisions, in tum, were informed by a lengthy 
scholarly debate about the nature of moral rights. Modem scholars 
divide this debate into three periods: 1793-1878, 1878-1902, and 1902­
1957.46 During each phase, scholarly notions ofthe origins and nature 
of moral rights influenced French judicial decisions, leading to the 
gradual recognition of these rights. 
During the first period, scholars debated whether the droit moral 
was a temporary property right or a part of a perpetual right of per­
sonality.47 Under the influence of early writings of Karl Marx, the 
personality approach eventually became dominant.48 By 1880, accept­
ance of these ideas led the French courts to recognize the rights of 
divulgation, paternity, and respect for works created under the guise 
of the personality approach.49 
During the second period, the personality approach completely 
eclipsed the property approach, and scholars began to focus more nar­
rowly on the scope of the moral right. 50 One school of thought held 
that the rights in any artistic work were a single, inseparable whole, 
and that all such rights were ultimately derived from the act of creat­
ing a work.51 The other approach viewed authors' rights as falling 
into two separate categories: personal (moral) and pecuniary. 52 
During the third period, the dual approach prevailed. This is the 
44. See infra notes 129-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of early English 
copyright law. 
45. DaSilva, supra note 13, at 9. 
46. Id.; Rosen, supra note 13, at 157. 
47. The French legal and philosophical scholar Gastambide viewed the moral right 
as a property right, while the philosopher Renouard viewed it as deriving from the right of 
personality. DaSilva, supra note 13, at 9-10. 
48. Id. at 10. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 10-11. Underlying this notion was a respect for artists and the creative 
process. The emphasis on the rights of the author, as opposed to the betterment of society, 
as the primary justification for copyright protection at least partly explains the major differ­
ences between the French and Anglo-American approaches. 
52. Id. at 10. 
152 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:145 
current view of authors' rights in France.53 This view of the author's 
moral right as personal and distinct from his or her pecuniary rights 
has been very important in shaping modem French judicially created 
copyright law. In 1957, the French parliament passed a copyright act 
("1957 Law") that remains in force today. 54 This law codified the ap­
proach to moral rights that had developed via judicial decisions since 
the French Revolution.55 The modem French system provides exten­
sive protection of an author's moral rights. 
Because French law views moral rights as personal, these rights 
adhere in the author, not the work, and cannot be transferred or 
waived.56 An author must meet two conditions in order to claim his 
or her moral rights under French law: the claimant of such moral 
rights must be a natural person who is, in fact, the author of the 
work. 57 Thus, the actual author retains the moral rights even in the 
case of a work for hire. 58 This approach mirrors that taken in judicial 
decisions prior to the 1957 codification.59 While the various moral 
rights (discussed individually below) are protected to different degrees, 
the 1957 Law affords at least some protection to each of them. 
The right to release a work (droit de divulgation) gives an author 
complete control over his or her work until the author chooses to dis­
close it.60 French courts have interpreted this right quite literally. In 
one case, an artist who had all but finished 800 paintings, and had 
delivered them to a dealer and received payment, was nevertheless 
able to rescind the contract and recover the paintings from the dealer's 
heirs upon repayment of his fee. 61 The author must exercise this right 
53. Id. at 11. 
54. Loi du 11 Mars 1957, No. 57-296, Sur La Propriete Literaire Artistique, J.O., 
translated in UNESCO, Copyright Laws and Treaties of the World (1976) [hereinafter 
1957 Law]. The 1957 Law was revised once, in July, 1985, but this revision did not effect 
protection of moral rights. For a discussion of the 1985 revisions, see Jane C. Ginsburg, 
Reforms and Innovations Regarding Authors' and Performers' Rights in France: Commen­
tary on the Law of July 3, 1985, 10 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 83 (1985). 
55. Chenais, supra note 31, at 333-36; DaSilva, supra note 13, at 11-16. 
56. DaSilva, supra note 13, at 12. 
57. Id. The natural person requirement had presented difficulties in cases of collec­
tive or collaborative works, especially cinematographic works. The 1957 Law created spe­
cial rules for moral rights in cinematographic works, limiting the authors of such works to 
those who .. 'realize the intellectual creation of the work,' ... the author of the script, the 
author of the adaptation, the author of the dialogue, the composer of the music, and the 
director." Id. at 13-14. 
58. [d. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 19. 
61. Judgment of March 19, 1947 (L'Affaire Rouault), Cour d'appel, Paris, 1949 
Recueil Periodique et Critique [D.P.] I 20, discussed in DaSilva, supra note 13, at 19 (citing 
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in good faith, and cannot refuse to release the work merely as a ploy to 
receive an increased fee. 62 This right is personal and, therefore, be­
longs to the author even if he or she has transferred all of the pecuni­
ary rights in a work.63 This right is also discretionary: neither a 
creditor nor a spouse can release any work over the objections of a 
living author.64 Finally, the droit de divulgation is exclusive, which 
means that any work transferred by an author can be exploited only to 
the extent the author's grant specifically authorizes the exploitation.6s 
Any contract will be interpreted in the author's favor; any method of 
disclosure not explicitly mentioned in the contract is forbidden. 66 The 
right is perpetual and passes to the author's heirs.67 Yet, concern that 
heirs may abuse the droit de divulgation has led French courts to hold 
that an heir can only exercise the right to "effectuat[e] the wishes of 
the deceased and not to serve his own interests."68 The 1957 Law 
gives courts wide latitude in cases of abuse of the droit de divulgation 
by the heir.69 
Thus, the right to release the work provides an author with sub­
stantial control over the treatment of his or her work, even after the 
work has been transferred. However, the right makes the most sense 
in the context of a work created by a single author. An exception for 
cinematographic works indicates how cumbersome the droit de divul­
gation can become in connection with a joint work.70 
Even after an author has released a work to the public, he or she 
retains the right to withdraw or modify the work (droit de retrait ou de 
Raymond Sarraute, Current Theory on the Moral Right of Authors and Anists Under 
French Law, 16 AM. J. CoMP. L. 465, 469-70 (1968». While an American court would be 
unlikely to order specific performance if an artist refused to create a work, it is equally 
unlikely that rescission would be allowed at so late a stage. See DaSilva, supra note 13, at 
18. 
62. DaSilva, supra note 13, at 18; Raymond Sarraute, Cu"ent Theory on the Moral 
Right ofAuthors and Anists Under French Law, 16 AM. J. CoMP. L. 465, 468 (1968). 
63. DaSilva, supra note 13, at 20. 
64. Id. at 20-21. The 1957 Law clarified the point that the author retains the droit 
de divulgation upon marriage despite the fact that all works produced during a marriage 
are community property under French matrimonial and divorce law. See id. (citing ALAIN 
LE TARNEC, MANUEL DE LA PROPRIETE LfITERAIRE ET ARTISfIQuE 28-29 (1966». 
65. DaSilva, supra note 13, at 21. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 14. 
68. Id. at 15 (citing Raymond Sarraute, Current Theory on the Moral Right ofAu­
thors and Anists Under French Law, 16 AM. J. COMPo L. 465, 465 (1968». 
69. The 1957 Law provides, "In a case of manifest abuse of the right to exercise or 
not to exercise the droit de divulgation on the part of the deceased author'S representatives, 
as provided for in the preceding article, the civil court may order any appropriate mea­
sure." 1957 Law, supra note 54, art. 20,111, quoted in DaSilva, supra note 13, at 15 n.I06. 
70. DaSilva, supra note 13, at 22. 
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repentir).71 Because there is less support in the pre-1957 judicial deci­
sions for the existence ofthe droit de retrait ou de repentir, its scope is 
less clear than that of the droit de divufgation. Perhaps this reflects 
logistical difficulties; particularly with works in multiple copies, once 
release or publication has occurred, withdrawing a work may be phys­
ically impossible, regardless of any ostensible right an author may 
have to withdraw it. Still, this right is codified in the 1957 Law, 
although it is subject to more limitations than any other moral right.72 
The droit de retrait ou de repentir is limited by a requirement of ad­
vance indemnification of the transferee and by a requirement that the 
prior transferee be offered right of first refusal if the artist chooses to 
re-release a modified work.73 Finally, most courts have held that this 
right does not survive the author, on the theory that exercise of this 
right requires the author's volition.74 
The third moral right, the right of authorship or droit a fa 
paternite, really provides the author with three rights: the right to be 
recognized as the author of a work, or to remain anonymous; the right 
not to have his or her work attributed to another; and the right not to 
have his or her name used in connection with a work created by an­
other.7s The right of recognition applies to one-of-a-kind works, all 
copies of a work, any pUblicity materials produced in connection with 
a work, any quotation, and all collaborators involved in a collective 
work.76 The right of proper attribution also applies to a wide variety 
of works.77 Finally, the right to prevent wrongful attribution applies 
in two distinct types of cases. The author can prevent use of his or her 
name in connection with a mutilated version of his or her work, or in 
71. Id. at 23. 
72. The law states: 

Notwithstanding the transfer of his right of exploitation. the author, even subse­

quent to the publication of his work, enjoys a right of modification or withdrawal 

vis-a-vis the transferee. Nonetheless, he may not exercise the right unless he 

agrees to indemnify the transferee in advance for any prejudice which such modi­

fication or withdrawal may cause him. 
1957 Law, supra note 54, art. 32, ~ I, quoted in DaSilva, supra note 13, at 23 n.156. 
73. DaSilva, supra note 13, at 24-26. 
74. Id. at 23-24. 
75. Id. at 26; Roeder, supra note 13, at 561-65. 
76. DaSilva, supra note 13, at 27; Sarraute, supra note 62, at 478-79. Both authors 
describe Guille c. Colmart, Judgment of Nov. IS, 1966, Cour d'appel, Paris, 1968 Recueil 
Dalloz-Sirey [D.S. Jur.] 284, in which the court held that a contract between an artist and a 
dealer which required the artist to leave unsigned all works produced for anyone but the 
dealer was void as violating the author's drait Ii 10 poternite. DaSilva, supra note 13, at 27; 
Sarraute, supra note 62, at 478-79. 
77. DaSilva, supra note 13, at 27. 
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connection with the advertising of any product or cause.78 The droit a 
fa paternite is perpetual,79 and cannot be waived.80 Because much of 
what the droit afa paternite protects is covered under personality and 
publicity tort law in common law systems, this right is less controver­
sial than most of the other moral rights. 
Many consider the last category of moral rights, the right of in­
tegrity or droit au respect de l'oeuvre, the most important of all moral 
rights.8! This right gives the author control over the disposition of his 
or her work even after sale or transfer, allowing the author to prevent 
alteration, distortion, or mutilation of the work.82 Because the droit 
au respect de l'oeuvre allows the author to prevent the owner of a work 
from using or disposing of it in certain ways, this right leads to the 
greatest conflict between the author's rights and property interests. 
The Bernard Buffet case provides an illustration of this conflict. Buffet 
had painted designs on all sides of a refrigerator. The owner of the 
refrigerator wanted to sell each panel of the appliance as a separate 
work. Buffet brought suit to enjoin the owner's action, arguing that 
the refrigerator was a single, indivisible work. The court found for 
Buffet, based on his right of integrity.83 French courts have also al­
lowed authors or their heirs to assert rights of integrity in cases of 
reputational harm, even when the works in question have passed into 
the public domain.84 Thus, the right of integrity appears to have 
broad application. This right, too, is perpetual.8s 
Some difficulties have arisen in application of the droit au respect 
in certain circumstances. It is not clear whether the right of integrity 
78. Id. at 27-28. Some authors have argued that this third category of paternity 
rights is not a species of copyright, but is rather a right of personality, unconnected with art 
or copyright. Id. at 29 (citing GERARD GAVIN, LE DROIT MORAL DE L'AUTEUR DANS 
LA JURISPRUDENCE ET LA LtGISLATION FRAN~AISES 55 (1960); William Strauss, The 
Moral Right of the Author, 4 AM. J. CoMP. L. 506, 508 n.5 (1955». 
79. DaSilva, supra note 13, at 4; Roeder, supra note 13, at 564. 
80. DaSilva, supra note 13, at 16. 
81. See. e.g., id. at 31 (citing Raymond Sarraute, Current Theory on the Moral Right 
ofAuthors and Artists Under French Law, 16 AM. J. CoMP. L. 465, 480 (1968». 
82. Id. at 31; Roeder, supra note 13, at 568-70. 
83. Judgment of May 30, 1962 (Fersing 1'. BujJet), Cour d'appel, Paris, Recueil Dal­
loz [D. Jur.] 570, ajJ'd Judgment of July 6, 1965, Cour de Cass., 1965 Gazette du Palais 
[G.P.) II 126, cited in DaSilva, supra note 13, at 31; Sarraute, supra note 62, at 480. 
84. DaSilva, supra note 13, at 32. In one case, the court allowed the granddaughter 
of Henri Rousseau to enjoin the use of her grandfather's paintings as window displays in a 
Paris department store. The court found that such use violated Rousseau's moral rights by 
damaging his reputation as an artist. Judgment of Mar. 13, 1973 (Bernard-Rousseau c. 
Societe des Galeries Lafayette), Trib. gr. inst. 3e, Paris, Le Seruaine Juridique [J.C.P.] No. 
224, discussed in DaSilva, supra note 13, at 32. 
85. DaSilva, supra note 13, at 14. 
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allows an author to prevent a transferee from completely destroying a 
work. Some courts have held that the right of integrity does not give 
an artist the right to prevent destruction of a work, since such destruc­
tion does not lead the public to believe that the artist is the author of a 
work not his or her own.86 Other courts have reached the opposite 
conclusion and have held that a transferee has no right to completely 
destroy a work. 87 
Another especially troubling problem is the application of the 
droit au respect in the context of derivative works. Since some changes 
are inevitable when adapting a work from one medium to another, 
courts have had difficulty determining where the adapter's rights end 
and actionable distortion or mutilation begins. If the author of the 
original work authorizes the adaptation of the work by contract, with 
no explicit restrictions, French courts will uphold the contract, but 
impose on the adapter a duty to act in good faith so as not to distort 
the "spirit of the original work."88 In cases of adaptation without an 
unlimited authorization from the original author, French courts have 
applied a general rule: the original author must accept all changes 
that the transfer in medium requires, and the adapter must transfer 
the spirit and substance of the work.89 Finally, if the contract of adap­
tation requires that the original author approve all changes, courts 
have held that the author cannot "unreasonably withhold his 
consent."90 
Overall, the French system of moral rights, which has influenced 
the development of article 6bis of the Berne Convention, is highly pro­
tective of authors. Because moral rights are personal, the artist retains 
a significant interest in and control over his or her work even after 
transfer. The rights are perpetual and thereby operate to prevent a 
work from ever passing completely into the public domain. No work 
is ever completely available for all uses the public sees fit. Finally, the 
nature of the moral rights, particularly the droit au respect, alters the 
nature of ownership of a work of art. Such ownership is incomplete by 
definition and, therefore, is unlike ownership of any other property. 
This partial retention of rights by the artist, and especially by his or 
her heirs, is antithetical to Anglo-American property law, with its em­
phasis on transfer and alienability, and is not a part of American copy­
86. Roeder, supra note 13, at 569. 
87. DaSilva, supra note 13, at 33. 
88. Id. at 35. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 36 (citing Dominique Giocanti, Moral Rights: Authors' Protection and 
Business Needs, 10 J. INT'L L. & EcON. 627, 642 (1975». 
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right tradition. Yet, by joining the Berne Convention, the United 
States has joined an international community that does recognize 
moral rights as necessary and desirable. In fact, the Berne Convention 
has come to reflect the French view of moral rights. 
II. THE BERNE CONVENTION 
The original text of the Berne Convention, signed at Berne, Swit­
zerland in 1886, was primarily the result of efforts by and on behalf of 
authors and artistS.91 The treaty followed nearly thirty years of meet­
ings about authors' rights sponsored by various nations and groups.92 
While even this first version was extremely protective of authors' 
rights, the nations that most favored authors (the droit d'auteur coun­
tries), such as France, made some concessions in order to reach agree­
ment with some of the other nations, most notably Great Britain.93 
For example, while both Germany and France favored a treaty that 
required a uniform set of copyright principles to be enacted in all 
member states, they settled for a requirement of national treatment. 94 
National treatment means that a nation will grant all the rights avail­
able under its domestic law to works by authors who are nationals of 
other Berne Union countries.9S This approach allowed nations to sign 
or accede to the treaty without requiring automatic changes in domes­
tic law.96 
There were some disagreements about the subject matter of copy­
right and the scope of the right of reproduction as well.97 The tension 
between the droit d'auteur countries and Great Britain was to con­
tinue throughout the development of the treaty. Still, the initial treaty 
did contain some substantive provisions. First, in Article 1, the draft­
ers explicitly stated that the Berne Union had been formed to protect 
91. For a concise discussion of the history of the Berne Convention, see Burger, 
supra note 21, at I, 8-50. For an extensive discussion of the development of the treaty, see 
I STEPHEN P. LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECrION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC 
PROPERTY (1938). 
92. For a complete description of the international conferences that led up to the 
Berne Convention, see Burger, supra note 21, at 11-16. 
93. Id. at 12-14. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 9-10. 
96. Id. at 12-13. 
97. The French delegation advocated extending protection to photographic works. 
This proposal failed. Id. at 13. In addition, a proposal allowing reproduction of certain 
works in instructional materials without the author's consent passed over French objec­
tions. Id. at 13-14. The French opposed even this limitation on the author's right to con­
trol his or her work. Id. 
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the rights of authors, as opposed to copyright owners generally.98 Sec­
ond, as discussed above, the treaty espoused the national treatment 
principle.99 Third, the treaty required no formalities, but allowed 
member countries to set up their own systems of prerequisite formali­
ties if they so chose. loo Fourth, the treaty set no minimum term of 
protection, and, in an exception to national treatment, the term of pro­
tection in the work's country of origin set the term of protection in all 
Union countries. 101 Fifth, the section describing points of attachment 
set out the rules for a work to receive protection under the treaty.102 
Sixth, the drafters provided an extensive, but not exclusive, list of the 
types of works protected under the Convention. 103 Finally, the treaty 
required member nations to grant the exclusive right of translation to 
authors for a ten year term. 104 The other rights were left to national 
treatment. lOS Thus, the initial version of the Berne Convention did 
not provide a long list of exclusive rights. It did lay the groundwork 
for the increased protection provided by the revisions that followed. 
Over the next thirty years, the members of the Berne Union re­
vised the Convention several times. 106 With each revision, the Union 
increased protection for authors, increased the minimum protection 
required of member nations, and moved toward uniformity of protec­
tion among the member nations.107 During this period, the delega­
tions from France and the other droit d'auteur nations continued to 
press for some recognition of moral rights in the Berne Convention. 108 
98. Id. at 16 (citing EDWARD W. PLOMAN & L. CLARK HAMILTON, COPYRIGHT: 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 49 (1980». 
99. Id. at 16. 
100. Id. at 17. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. A complete discussion of points of attachment is beyond the scope of this 
Article. This section of the treaty discussed the way nationality was assigned to a certain 
work. For example, an author who was not a national of a country belonging to the Berne 
Union could receive protection under the treaty if he or she first published the work in 
question in a nation belonging to the Berne Union. Id. 
103. Id. at 18. The original version of the Berne Convention applied to "books, 
pamphlets, and all other writings; dramatic or dramatico-musical works, musical composi­
tions with or without words; works of design, painting, sculpture, and engraving; litho­
graphs, illustrations, maps; plans, sketches, and three-dimensional works relative to 
geography, topography, architecture, or science in general." Id. (quoting Berne Conven­
tion of 1886, supra note I, art. 4). 
104. Burger, supra note 21, at 18. The translation right was the only exclusive right 
provided by the first version of the treaty. Id. 
105. Id. at 19. 
106. See supra notes I, 5. 
107. See supra note 1. For a complete discussion of the important aspects of the 
early revisions of the Berne Convention, see Burger, supra note 21. 
108. See Burger, supra note 21. 
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The Berne Union explicitly addressed the issue of moral rights for 
the first time at the revision conference held at Rome in 1928. By this 
time, there were thirty-six nations in the Berne Union, making the 
amendment process much more difficult. 109 The Rome Revision of 
1928 added two new exclusive rights. First, the Convention now re­
quired protection of the broadcast right, defined as "the exclusive right 
of authorizing the communication of [authors'] works to the public by 
radio-communication."llo Second, the Rome Revision of 1928 recog­
nized the author's moral right (droit moral) for the first time. 1 11 The 
moral right as phrased in the Rome Revision of 1928 had two ele­
ments: "the right to claim authorship of the work,"112 and "the right 
to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the 
said work which would be prejudicial to [the author's] honour or repu­
tation."113 The moral right endured only during the author's lifetime, 
and the method of protection of the right was a matter for each mem­
ber nation's domestic legislation. 114 The moral right introduced in the 
Rome Revision of 1928 was quite limited. Over the course of the next 
several revisions and amendments of the Berne Convention, however, 
this right grew in scope and importance. 
The Brussels Revision of 1948 increased Convention protection of 
authors' rights considerably. 1 IS With respect to the author's moral 
right, the revision made two important changes. First, it required that 
109. Id. at 27 (citing STEPHEN P. LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF 
LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY 97 (1938». In part for this reason, the Italian delega­
tion's proposal to make the life plus 50 year term mandatory failed; the term of protection 
remained a matter of national treatment. The delegates did add oral works, with an exclu­
sion allowed for political works, to the list of works protected. Id. (citing LADAS, supra, at 
96). 
110. Id. at 28 (quoting Rome Revision of 1928, supra note 1, art. 11bis , para. 1). 
This right was subject to domestic limitations, such as compulsory licensing schemes. 
Rome Revision of 1928, supra note 1, para. 2. 
111. Rome Revision of 1928, supra note 1, art. 6bis. 
112. Id. para. 1. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. See also STEWART, supra note 31, at 94-95. 
115. First, the life plus 50 year term of protection became mandatory. Brussels Revi­
sion of 1948, supra note 1, art. 7 paras. 1, 2. Second, works of applied art were added to the 
list of protected works. Id. art. 2, paras. 1, 2. Third, the revision increased the scope of 
several of the exclusive rights: the broadcasting right, the right of adaptation, the recording 
right, the cinematographic right, and the moral right. Id. arts. 6 bis, 11 bis & 12-14. 
Fourth, the Brussels Revision added the exclusive rights of public performance. Id. art. 11. 
Finally, this revision added the droit de suite. Id. art. 14. This right gives the author of a 
work "an interest in any sale of the work subsequent to the first disposal of the work by the 
author." Id. The droit de suite was a matter for national treatment, and subject to reci­
procity, rather than a required minimum. Id. art. 14. For a summary of the Brussels 
Revision of 1948, see STEWART, supra note 31, at 95-101; Burger, supra note 21, at 29-38. 
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member nations recognize the moral right throughout the entire copy­
right term (life of the author plus fifty years), if domestic legislation so 
allowed. 116 Because this provision did not compel member nations to 
change their domestic law to provide a full term of moral rights, it did 
not in fact increase the minimum protection of moral rights. Still, it 
did signal a desire on the part of most countries in the Berne Union to 
extend the duration of the moral right. 117 Second, the revision for the 
first time incorporated the droit de suite, which may also reflect the 
growing influence of the droit moral approach. 118 The most recent 
revision bears out this interpretation. 
The Berne Union held another revision conference at Stockholm 
in 1967. This conference produced two documents: a general revision 
of the Convention and an additional protocol concerning developing 
countries. 1l9 The general revisions were finally accepted with few 
changes in 1971 at Paris; the protocol was never ratified. 120 
The version of the Berne Convention currently in force, to which 
the United States has acceded,l2l is the Paris Revision of 1971. 122 The 
Berne Union changed the treaty in several significant ways at this 
time. 123 
Most importantly for the purposes of this analysis, the Paris Revi­
sion of 1971 adopted the suggestion, first made at Brussels, to extend 
the minimum term of protection of moral rights to match that of the 
economic rights: life of the author plus fifty years. 124 The revision 
granted an exception for those nations "whose legislation, at the mo­
ment of their ratification of or accession to [the Convention], does not 
provide for the protection after the death of the author of all the 
116. Brussels Revision of 1948, supra note 1, art. 6bis, para. 1. 
117. Burger, supra note 21, at 32. 
118. See infra notes 124-26 and accompanying text. 
119. Stockholm Revision of 1967, supra note 1. 
120. STEWART, supra note 31, at 101. 
121. BCIA, supra note 22. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text. 
122. Paris Revision of 1971, supra note 1. For a discussion of the provisions of the 
Paris Revision of 1971, see STEWART, supra note 31, at 101-30. 
123. This version contains a revision of the Stockholm protocol on Third World 
nations attached as an appendix to the Convention. Paris Revision of 1971, supra note 1, at 
app. The appendix provides developing nations with the right to set up certain compulsory 
license schemes that the Convention would otherwise not allow. Id. The revision also 
contains a new definition of published works, various provisions increasing the minimum 
terms of protection required for works of applied arts and cinematographic and photo­
graphic works, a change in the requirements for protection of works by authors from non­
Union nations, protection for choreographic works not fixed in a tangible medium of 
expression, and a new right-reproduction. Id. art. 3, para. 3; art. 7, paras. 2, 4; para. 8; 
art. 2, para. 1; art. 9, para. 7. 
124. Id. art. 6bis, para. 2. 
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[moral] rights."12s The exception allowed nations that protect moral 
rights through the common law to remain in compliance. 126 
Overall, three trends in the development of the Berne Convention 
indicate potential problems for the United States in connection with 
moral rights. First, the protection for authors provided under the 
Berne Convention has increased over its history. Second, minimum 
rights have increased. Each revision has moved toward more, and 
more uniform, protection. Finally, protection for moral rights has in­
creased with each revision since the rights were added in 1928. While 
some of the improvements in moral rights protection have been sym­
bolic rather than substantive,127 the Berne Union clearly takes these 
rights seriously. This, coupled with the trend toward uniform protec­
tion, indicates that the United States must move to protect these rights 
as well. 
Anglo-American copyright law, however, developed out of a dif­
ferent tradition. As discussed below, protection for moral rights in the 
United States has thus far fallen far short of the standards set in the 
droit moral countries. 
III. ANGLO-AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW 
A. English Copyright Law 
American copyright law grew out of the copyright law of Eng­
land, which developed very differently from that of the continent. In 
England, publishers, not authors, provided the initial impetus for 
copyright protection. 128 With the invention of the printing press, 
piracy became a serious threat to both publishers and booksellers. 129 
Printing required a substantial investment on the part of the publish­
ers and they needed to recoup this investment through sales. Piracy 
cut deeply into their profits. 130 In order to protect this interest, many 
European nations, including England, set up licensing schemes during 
125. Id. 
126. For a discussion of the moral rights provision in the Paris Revision, see STEW­
ART, supra note 31, at 108; Burger, supra note 21, at 46. 
127. See supra notes 110-18, 124-26 and accompanying text. 
128. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 1; Oman, supra note 21, at 109-10. 
129. See. e.g., Burger, supra note 21, at 3, 4 n.6 (citing EDWARD W. PLOMAN & L. 
CLARK HAMILTON, COPYRIGHT: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 
9-18 (1980»; Richard P. Adelstein & Steven I. Peretz, The Competition 0/ Technologies in 
Markets/or Ideas: Copyright and Fair Use in Evolutionary Perspective,S INT'L REV. L. & 
BeON. 209, 224-26 (1985). See also STEWART, supra note 31, at 15. 
130. STEWART, supra note 31, at 15. The pirates could produce for less than the 
legitimate publishers by copying them after they appeared in print, thereby saving the cost 
of purchasing the author's manuscript. Burger, supra note 21, at 3 (citing Richard P. Ade1­
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the sixteenth century that provided monopoly rights of reproduction 
and distribution in certain works for limited times.l31 The remedies 
for infringement of these rights were fines, and seizure and confisca­
tion of the infringing materials. 132 
The licensing schemes in England, however, were not designed to 
benefit authors. One prominent nineteenth-century scholar stated of 
the licensing systems, "[W]hatever benefit they may have been to au­
thors, . . . their primary and chief object was the regulation of the 
press for political and ecclesiastical purposes;" 133 Even these rights 
were granted only in the face of a threat to the publishing industry, 
which could arguably have led to a decline in the number of works 
available. Nothing in the licensing acts provided for authors' rights, 
except secondarily through the monopoly granted to publishers. 134 
Some version of this exclusive licensing system prevailed in England 
until 1694 when the last licensing act expired. 13S Sixteen years later, 
England enacted a copyright statute. 136 
The Statute of Anne, J37 the first English copyright statute, re­
flected the same fairly narrow economic concerns as did the licensing 
acts.138 Enacted in 1710, the Statute of Anne provided the owners of 
copyright in works already published with exclusive rights of publica­
tion and distribution for twenty- one years.139 The statute granted the 
same exclusive rights to authors of works not yet published, but for 
only fourteen years. l40 In either case, the works belonged to the au­
thor for an additional fourteen-year term if the author survived the 
first term.141 The remedies provided were similar to those available 
under the licensing acts: confiscation and destruction of the infringing 
stein & Steven I. Peretz, The Competition of Technologies in Markets for Ideas: Copyright 
and Fair Use in Evolutionary Perspective, 5 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 209, 224 (1985». 
131. EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLEC­
TUAL PRODUCTIONS 57 (Rothman Reprints 1972) (1879); STEWART, supra note 31, at 15­
16. 
132. DRONE, supra note 131, at 57. 
133. Id. at 55. 
134. Authors may have indirectly benefitted from the printers' monopoly created by 
the licensing schemes because only the legitimate publishers, who paid for authors' manu­
scripts, could now publish. This may have led to increased economic benefit, at least to 
those authors who were paid royalties based on the number of copies of their works sold. 
135. DRONE, supra note 131, at 68. 
136. Id. at 69. 
137. 8 Anne, ch. 19 (1710). 
138. Burger, supra note 21, at 6. 
139. DRONE, supra note 131, at 69-70. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
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materials, with small money damages. 142 Compared to modern copy­
right statutes, the Statute of Anne was quite limited, but it did repre­
sent the first mention of authors' rights in connection with 
copyright. 143 Still, the Statute of Anne recognized in authors only 
those rights that the licensing acts had recognized in pUblishers-pe­
cuniary rights. 
Gradually, English copyright law extended the term of protection 
granted and the subject matter for protection. l44 In addition, certain 
formal requiremen.ts were added as prerequisites for protection.14s 
These alterations to the Statute of Anne were consolidated in the 
Copyright Act of 1911.146 The economic rationale that supported the 
licensing acts remained the primary justification for English copyright 
protection. 147 
B. American Copyright Law 
Copyright law in America before the American Revolution was 
concerned only with the protection of commercial rights and did not 
differ significantly from that of England. 148 Even after the revolution, 
copyright law in the United States developed similarly to that of Eng­
land. The Constitution conferred upon Congress the power to grant 
rights to authors and scientists: "The Congress shall have power . . . 
to promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by securing for 
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their re­
spective writings and discoveries."149 One year after the Constitution 
was ratified, in 1790, Congress passed the first American copyright 
statute.1so 
This statute was very similar to the English copyright statutes of 
the time in important respects, retaining "the distinction between 
common law rights in unpublished works and statutory rights in pub­
lished works, registration and deposit provisions, the same two-tier 
term of copyright, the remedies for infringement and the lack of any 
provisions dealing with the moral right of authors."ISI In addition, 
142. Id. See also STEWART, supra note 31, at 22. 
143. STEWART, supra note 31, at 22. 

"144. Id. at 24. 

145. Id.; Chesnais, supra note 31, at 93-94. 
146. STEWART, supra note 31, at 24; see also Copyright Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, ch. 
46. 
147. Burger, supra note 21, at 6. 
148. STEWART, supra note 31, at 24. 
149. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8. 
150. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. IS, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) (repealed). 
151. STEWART, supra note 31, at 25. 
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this first copyright Act extended no protection to foreign authors. IS2 
This lack of protection allowed American readers access to cheap, pi­
rated versions of European works, but also left works by American 
authors open to pirating in Europe.IS3 Eventually, as American litera­
ture developed and demand for some American works increased 
abroad, the cost of piracy became too great to ignore. ls4 The Copy­
right Law of 189}lSS extended copyright protection to works by for­
eign authors manufactured in the United States. IS6 Until the passage 
of the Copyright Act of 1976,ls7 the requirement of American manu­
facture for protection of foreign works remained in all American copy­
right statutes. ISS 
In 1909, after several years of debate and compromise, Congress 
passed a new copyright statute. IS9 While the Berne Convention had 
been in existence since 1886 and many scholars and practitioners ad­
vocated conforming the new law to the treaty's requirements, the 1909 
Act fell far short of this goal. First, the new law retained the formali­
ties of notice, registration, and deposit; 160 the Berlin Revision of 1908 
had abolished formalities. 161 Second, the Act did not comply with the 
Berne Convention's national-treatment principle, in that works in 
English by foreign authors were only protected if they were manufac­
tured in the United States. 162 Other changes, not affecting interna­
tional copyright, included extension of the renewal term from fourteen 
to twenty-eight years, 163 which made the maximum term possible fifty­
six years; 164 allowing for statutory copyright of unpublished works 
designed for performance; 16S and certain evidentiary presumptions as­
sociated with registration. 166 The Act retained the two-tier system of 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 25. See also Barbara Ringer, Two Hundred Years 0/American Copyright 
Law 124, in Two HUNDRED YEARS Of ENGLISH & AMERICAN PATENT, TRADEMARK & 
COPYRIGHT LAW (Bicentenary Symposium of the A.B.A. 1976). 
155. Ch. 565, 26 Stat. 1106 (1891) (repealed). 
156. STEWART, supra note 31, at 25-26; Ringer, supra note 154, at 127. 
157. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 101-914 (1988». 
158. STEWART, supra note 31, at 26. 
159. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 16-349, 35 Stat. 1075 [hereinafter Copy­
right Act of 1909]. 
160. Id. sees. 10, II, & 13, 35 Stat. 1075, 1078. 
161. Berlin Revision of 1908, supra note 1. See Burger, supra note 21, at 23. 
162. Copyright Act of 1909, supra note 159, sec. 25, 35 Stat. 1078. 
163. Id. sec. 23, 35 Stat. 1080. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. see. 5, 35 Stat. 1076. 
166. Id. 
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copyright, with perpetual common law protection for unpublished 
works and limited statutory protection for published works.167 
Overall, the 1909 Act did not really represent a move towards the 
approach taken by the Berne Convention. The Act retained most of 
the barriers to Berne Union membership. Nonetheless, with minor 
amendments, the 1909 Act remained in force for over sixty-five years. 
The next major revision of American copyright law came in 
1976,168 Congress authorized the revision in 1955 and a long process 
of study, reports, and debate followed. 169 Again, many argued that 
United States law should be brought into compliance with the Berne 
Convention. 170 By this time, the treaty had been revised to include the 
required protection of moral rights l71 and to extend protection to cer­
tain applied arts.172 Thus, in order to conform to the Berne Conven­
tion standards, Congress would have needed to make three significant 
changes in American copyright law: extend protection to certain ap­
plied arts, provide some protection for moral rights, and dispense with 
required formalities. Ultimately, Congress made none of these 
changes,173 although the Copyright Act of 1976174 altered the law sub­
stantially in areas that did not affect international copyright. 17S 
Thus, even in the mid-1970's, Congress was unwilling to make 
167. Id. 
168. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended 
at 17 U.S.c. §§ 101-914 (1988». 
169. For a brief discussion of the legislative history of the 1976 Act, see Jessica D. 
Litman, Copyright. Compromise. and Legislative History, 72 CoRNELL L. REV. 857 (1987). 
See also Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680. H.R. 6831. H.R. 6835 Be/ore Subcomm. No.3 
o/the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. reprinted in 5 OMNIBUS Copy­
RIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 31-32 (pt. 1 1965); U.S. CoPYRIGHT OFFICE, 
BRIEFING PAPERS ON CURRENT ISSUES RAISED BY H.R. 2223, reprinted in 16 OMNIBUS 
COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY app. 2, 2051-91 (Pt. 3 1975). 
170. See generally Oman, supra note 21. 
171. For a discussion of the development of the moral rights provisions of the Berne 
Convention, see supra notes 108-27 and accompanying text. 
172. See Burger, supra note 21, at 31-32. 
173. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, sees. 401-412, 90 Stat. 2576-83 
(formalities); 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988) (subject matter not including applied arts); id. § 106 
(exclusive rights, no mention of moral rights). 
174. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 101-914 (1988». 
175. The 1976 Act abolished common law copyright in unpublished works; all "orig­
inal works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression" were henceforth pro­
tected by statute. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988). A single term of life of the author plus 50 years 
replaced the renewal system. Id. § 302. A provision allowing authors to terminate trans­
fers was added. Id. § 304. The 1976 Act explicitly recognized the defense of fair use to an 
infringement action. [d. § 107. Courts had long recognized this defense, which was not 
mentioned in the 1909 Act. For a complete discussion of the differences between the 1909 
and 1976 Copyright Acts, see Litman, supra note 169. 
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the changes in American copyright law necessary to confonn to the 
Berne Convention standards. The fonnalities were the most tenacious 
features of the old law. 176 There was considerable opposition to pro­
tecting moral rights, as well. 177 These concerns kept the United States 
out of the Berne Union for another twelve years. Instead, the United 
States relied for international copyright protection on the Universal 
Copyright Convention. 17s 
Finally, in 1988, the benefits of adherence to the Berne Conven­
tion became too substantial to ignore. Congress passed the Berne 
Convention Implementation Act ("BCIA"), which purported to revise 
American copyright law in accordance with the requirements of the 
Berne Convention,l79 The BCIA deleted all provisions of the 1976 
Copyright Act that made protection contingent upon compliance with 
fonnalities, ISO but added no provision protecting moral rights. 
Rather, the BCIA explicitly stated that it did not expand or contract 
protection of authors' moral rights. lSI The drafters of the BCIA took 
the position that state common law protection of moral rights com­
plied with the Berne Convention requirements,ls2 despite disagree­
176. Oman, supra note 21, at 81-89. 
177. Id. at 93-95. 
178. July 24, 1971,943 U.N.T.S. 178. The Universal Copyright Convention, an in­
ternational copyright treaty designed to provide some protection abroad for works by 
American authors and by others from non-Berne countries, is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
179. BCIA, supra note 22, sec. 2(3), 102 Stat. 2853 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 
(Historical and Revision Notes) (1988». 
180. Id. sec. 7, 102 Stat. 2857-59 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 401-412 (1988». 
181. Id. sec. 3(b), 102 Stat. 2853 (codified at 17 U.S.c. § 101 (Historical and Revi­
sion Notes) (1988». 	 The section reads: 
The provisions of the Berne Convention, the adherence of the United States 
thereto, and the satisfaction of United States obligations thereunder, do not ex­
pand or reduce any right of an author of a work, whether claimed under Federal, 
State, or the common law--(l) to claim authorship ofthe work; or (2) to object to 
any distortion, mutilation, or other modification of, or other derogatory action in 
relation to, the work, that would prejudice the author's honor or reputation. 
Id. 
182. The House Committee Report stated: "Based on a comparison of its laws with 
those of Berne member countries, and on the current status of Federal and State protec­
tions of the rights of paternity and integrity, the Committee finds that current United States 
law meets the requirements of Article 6bis." H.R. REP. No. 609, l00th Cong., 2d Sess., 38 
(1988), cited in Damich I, supra note 29, at 292 n.7 [hereinafter House Report on Imple­
. mentation Act]. 	 In reaching this conclusion, the Committee relied on 17 U.S.C. § 106 
(1988) (derivative works); 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) (distortions ofmusica1 works under a com­
pulsory license); 17 U.S.C. § 203 (termination of copyright transfers); and § 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § I 125(a) (1988) (false designation of origin). The Committee also 
cited state and local common law of publicity, contract, defamation, and privacy, and state 
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ment on this issue among experts. 183 
Congress increased federal protection of moral rights in October, 
1990, when both houses passed the Visual Artists Rights Act of 
1990. 184 This Act provides authors of certain works of visual art with 
rights of integrity and paternity.18S These rights are retained by the 
artist, unless he or she expressly waives them, even if copyright in the 
work is transferred. 186 Unlike economic rights, these moral rights 
cannot be transferred. 187 One section of the Act deals specifically with 
the problems of works of visual art incorporated into buildings. 188 
Overall, the Act appears to provide visual artists with many, if not all, 
of the rights contemplated by article 6bis of the Berne Convention. 
As discussed below, however, the Visual Artists Rights Act 
presents significant problems, both in the scope of its coverage and in 
its incompatibility with the rest of American copyright law. This in­
compatibility results from the American view of the underlying pur­
poses of copyright law. The Copyright Clause of the Constitution 
statutes providing rights of integrity and paternity. House Report on Implementation Act, 
supra, at 34. 
183. See. e.g., Edward J. Damich, Moral Rights in the United States and Article 6bis 
of the Berne Convention: A Comment on the Preliminary Report of the Ad Hoc Working 
Graup on u.s. Adherence to the Berne Convention, 10 COLuM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 143 
(1986) [hereinafter Damich II]. 
184. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990) (to be codified in scattered sections 
of 17 U.S.C.). 
185. See id. sec. 603, 104 Stat. 5128. The Act states: 
[T]he author of a work of visual art ... shall have the right to claim authorship of 
that work, and ... to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any work 
of visual art which he or she did not create; ... to prevent the use of his or her 
name as the author of the work of visual art in the event of a distortion, mutila­
tion, or other modification of the work which would be prejudicial to his or her 
honor or reputation; ... to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other 
modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or repu­
tation, and any intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification of that work is 
a violation of that right, ... [and the right] to prevent any destruction of a work 
of recognized stature, and any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that 
work is a violation of that right. 
Id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § I06A). 
186. See id. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § I06A(b), (e)(I)-(2». 
187. See id. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § I06A(e)(I». 
188. See id. sec. 604,104 Stat. 5130 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 113(d». For works 
installed prior to the effective date of the Act, and for works installed pursuant to an ex­
press contract signed by the owner of the building and the artist that the work may be 
subject to destruction or modification by removal from the building, the right of integrity 
shall not apply. Id. For works installed after the effective date of the Act, and not pursu­
ant to an express contract as described above, and where the work may be removable with­
out destruction, the building owner must make a good faith effort to contact the artist. Id. 
A good faith effort will be presumed if the owner attempts to contact the artist by regis­
tered mail. Id. 
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indicates that the primary concern of American copyright law is the 
public interest, the promotion of science and the useful artS. 189 The 
concept of moral rights developed out of French copyright law. As 
discussed below, the emphasis of French copyright law is quite 
different. 
IV. THE FUTURE OF MORAL RIGHTS IN THE BERNE 

CONVENTION AND THE UNITED STATES 

A. Sources Cited in the Legislative History of the BCIA 
As discussed above, Congress concluded that the protection of 
moral rights available under federal and state copyright law in 1988 
complied adequately with the requirements of article 6bis of the Berne 
Convention. l90 The BCIA explicitly states that no new rights were 
created by virtue of the United States' adherence to the Berne Conven­
tion. 191 Yet, both before and since the passage of the BCIA, scholars 
have debated whether the United States is in fact complying with the 
minimum provisions for the protection of moral rights that the Berne 
Convention requires}92 This Section will examine the provisions of 
American law cited by Congress as complying with article 6bis in 
1988, and the new Visual Artists Rights Act. Ultimately, this Section 
will argue that current protection of moral rights under American law 
may be inadequate now, and certainly raises concerns for the future, 
given the dual trends in the Berne Convention towards uniform mini­
mum rights and in favor of increased protection for moral rights. 
One source of protection cited by Congress is state moral rights 
statutes. 193 However, there are several problems with these statutes in 
terms of compliance with the Berne Convention. First, these statutes, 
like the Visual Artists Rights Act, protect moral rights only in visual 
works. 194 Second, many of these statutes provide that moral rights 
189. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
190. See supra notes 179-83 and accompanying text. 
191. See supra notes 179-83 and accompanying text. 
192. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg & John M. Kernochan, One Hundred and Two 
Years Later: The U.S. Joins the Berne Convention, 13 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1,27-37 
(1988). But see Damich II, supra note 182, at 655. 
193. See supra note 179. 
194. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 987-90 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 42-116t (West 1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2151-56 (West 1987); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303 (West 1988); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 231, § 85S (West 1986); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2A:24A-l to 2A:24A-8 (West 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B-3 (Michie 
1988); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 14.01, 14.03 (McKinney & Supp. 1992); PA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 2101-10 (Supp. 1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-62-2 to 5-62-6 (1987). 
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terminate upon the death of the author. 195 Third, most state moral 
rights statutes provide that the rights are completely waivable, thereby 
defeating the purpose of moral rights, to protect the author, who may 
be in a weak bargaining position. 196 Finally, because most states have 
no such statute, an artist from a nation belonging to the Berne Union 
who distributes his or her work in a state without such a statute can­
not bring a claim for violation of moral rights. Thus, while these stat­
utes do provide a modicum of protection for moral rights, taken alone 
they cannot be said to fulfill the United States' obligation of minimum 
protection under the Berne Convention. 
Congress cited several sources as protective of the right of integ­
rity. First among these is section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,197 con­
cerning false designation of origin, which was construed as protective 
of this right. 198 However, while this section may provide a cause of 
action to an artist whose name is falsely affixed to the work of another, 
nothing in this statute necessarily provides relief to an author whose 
work is mutilated. While some courts have recognized false designa­
tion and unfair competition claims by audiovisual artists whose works 
have been severely edited,199 the language of section 43(a) does not 
mention artistic works, and does not require this result. 200 Also, be­
cause the focus of section 43(a) is deception of consumers, an author 
whose work is mutilated but not labelled as his or her product cannot 
195. Damich I, supra note 29, at 294. 
196. Id. 
197. Lanham Trade-marks Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988) [hereinafter Lan­
ham Act]. 
198. House Report on Implementation Act, supra note 182, at 34. Lanham Act 
§ 43(a) provides: 
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container 
for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any 
combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading de­
scription of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which­
(1) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the 
affiliation, connection, or association or such person with another person, 
or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services 
or commercial activities by another person, or 
(2) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, char­
acteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another per­
son's goods, services, or commercial activities, 
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is 
likely to be damaged by such act. 
Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988). 
199. See, e.g., Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976); 
Jaeger v. American Int'l Pictures, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
200. See Lanham Act, supra note 197. 
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state a claim for false designation of origin.201 Yet, his or her right of 
integrity has been violated. At best, then, section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act offers only partial protection for the right of integrity. 
Congress' suggestion that an author's exclusive right to authorize 
derivative works protects the right of integrity is also ftawed.202 While 
an author may retain the right to authorize derivative works, either by 
retaining the work or by transferring the work with an express reser­
vation of this right, the right is not personal and automatically re­
tained by the author.203 This does not satisfy the requirements of 
article 6bis, which states that the author must retain his or her moral 
rights "even after the transfer of [economic] rights."204 An American 
artist seeking to protect his or her right of integrity through use of the 
right to authorize derivative works must expressly retain the latter 
right by contract. Thus, a new author, in a relatively weak bargaining 
position, may well be unable to retain this right. Yet, arguably, it is 
new authors who need this protection most of all. The approach taken 
in the Berne Convention requires that this right be automatically re­
tained by the author. The derivative-works right, too, provides at best 
partial protection for the right of integrity. 
Article 6bis of the Berne Convention also requires that member 
nations protect an author's right "to claim authorship of the work."20s 
This right corresponds to the French droit ala paterniti.206 Congress 
cited state contract and unfair competition law and section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act as providing adequate protection for this moral right. 207 
First, none of these sources provides adequate relief to an author 
whose name is omitted from his or her work. State unfair competition 
law does not address this concern. Rather, this law is concerned with 
consumer protection and false marketing techniques. An author could 
secure the right to demand attribution by an express term in a con­
tract. Reliance on contract law is misplaced to fulfill the Berne Con­
vention requirements because article 6bis contemplates that an author 
will retain his or her moral rights upon transfer of a work without any 
affirmative action. 208 
201. Id. 
202. House Report on Implementation Act, supra note 182, at 34. 
203. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988). 
204. Paris Revision of 1971, supra note I, art. 6bis, para. 1. 
205. Id. 
206. Damich II, supra note 183, at 656. For a discussion of the protection of the 
droit a fa paternite under French law, see supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text. 
207. House Report on Implementation Act, supra note 182, at 34. 
208. Paris Revision of 1971, supra note 1, art. 6bis. 
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The problem here is similar to that discussed above, in connection 
with derivative works. In order for this right to be meaningful to all 
authors, even unknown ones, the author must retain the right auto­
matically. The notion of article 6bis is that the author has these rights 
and need not possess or exercise any economic leverage to retain them. 
Finally, reliance on state common law presents the same problems as 
does reliance on state moral rights statutes: they do not provide uni­
form protection.209 Thus, none of the sources cited protects the right 
of proper attribution. 
Congress is on stronger ground in citing section 43(a) of the Lan­
ham Act as protecting an author's right not to have another's work 
attributed to him or her, and the right not to have his or her work 
attributed to another. In these cases, the author could state a claim 
for false designation of origin: the mislabelling of the work would be 
likely to cause confusion.210 Current American law may well provide 
for this aspect of the droit ala patemite. 
Thus, the sources of protection of moral rights cited by Congress 
in support of its view that American law already conforms to the 
Berne Convention are probably inadequate. The passage of moral 
rights statutes in some states2l1 indicates that interest in protecting 
these rights is growing. Yet the concepts that underlie moral rights 
are foreign to the American legal tradition, and attempts to legislate 
recognition of these rights can lead to difficulties. 
B. 	 An Expansion of Recognition ofMoral Rights: The Visual 
Artists Rights Act of 1990 
Congress took a huge step toward recognition of moral rights 
when it passed the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990.212 A closer look 
at the Visual Artists Rights Act, however, reveals significant 
problems. First, the Act applies only to visual artists, narrowly de­
fined;213 authors of other works must still rely on the patchwork of 
209. While a survey of state unfair competition law is beyond the scope of this Arti­
cle, states provide a variety of statutory and common law causes of action for unfair compe­
tition, and there is no reason to assume that each state would interpret its provisions as 
protective of the droit d la patemite. 
210. 	 See Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.c. § 1l25(a) (1988). 
211. 	 See supra note 193. 
212. 	 See supra notes 184-88 and accompanying text. 
213. The Act defines a work of visual art as: 
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a limited 
edition of 200 copies or, fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the 
author, or, in the case of a SCUlpture, in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated sculp­
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other sources for protection of their moral rights. 214 Thus, the Act 
does little to bring the United States into compliance with the mini­
mum requirements of article 6bis. 
Second, the description of the rights provided is very vague.21S 
While such language may convey a specific meaning in droit moral 
countries, with a tradition of natural rights, it seems incompletely 
grafted onto the otherwise specific and technical copyright ACt.216 
The different styles in the two sections reflects the difference between 
moral and economic rights. The 1976 Act, concerned with securing 
pecuniary rights for the copyright owner, describes the various 
rights-reproduction, authorization of derivative works, distribution, 
performance, and display-so that each party will know what his or 
her rights are. In contrast, moral rights seek to protect much more 
impalpable interests, and cannot be discussed in precise, technical lan­
guage. The very concept of moral rights is drawn from a natural law 
tradition, in which language like that of the Visual Artists Rights Act 
is meaningful. Merely adding such language to a statute designed to 
. protect fundamentally different rights will lead to more confusion than 
protection. 
Third, while the duration of the rights provided meets the re­
quirements of article 6bis, it does so only because of an exception in 
that article specifically included to keep nations that protect moral 
rights under common law in compliance.217 Section 603(d)(2) pro­
vides that moral rights in works created before the effective date of the 
Act "shall be coextensive with . . . the rights conferred by section 
106"218 (i.e., life of the author plus fifty years). Yet, the duration of 
moral rights in a work created after the effective date of the Act is the 
tures of 200 or fewer that are consecutively numbered by the author and bear the 
signature or other identifying mark of the author; or 
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, existing in a 
single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited edition of 200 copies or 
fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author. 
Visual Artists Rights Act, sec. 602, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990) (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. 
§ 101). 
214. See supra note 182 for a listing of other sources of protection of moral rights in 
American law. See supra notes 194-211 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
inadequacy of the protection afforded by these provisions. 
215. See supra note 185 for the text of the statute describing the rights provided. 
216. Section 603 of the Visual Artists Rights Act will be codified at 17 U.S.c. 
§ 106A, immediately following § 106, which describes the other exclusive rights of the 
copyright owner. If one reads the two sections in this sequence, the contrast between the 
two different approaches is quite jarring. Compare Visual Artists Rights Act, sec. 603, 104 
Stat. 5128-30 with 17 U.S.c. § 106 (1988). 
217. Burger, supra note 21, at 46; STEWART, supra note 31, at 108. 
218. Visual Artists Rights Act, sec. 603 (to be codified at 17 U.S.c. § 106A(d)(2». 
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life of the author only.219 The moral rights provision of the Berne 
Convention states, "[T]hose countries whose legislation, at the mo­
ment of their ratification of or accession to this Act, does not provide 
for the protection after the death of the author of all the rights set out 
in the preceding paragraph may provide that some of these rights may, 
after his death, cease to be maintained."220 Arguably, because the 
United States did not protect all moral rights for the life of the author 
plus fifty years when it acceded to the treaty, it is free to enact new 
moral rights provisions with terms shorter than life plus fifty years. 
This approach, however, is not consistent with the trend toward mak­
ing moral rights coequal with economic rights. The disparity between 
the duration of the two categories of rights, along with the limited 
coverage of the 1990 statute, indicates a reluctance to provide full rec­
ognition to moral rights. 
This reluctance, in tum, stems from the Anglo-American view of 
copyright and intellectual property. While the Copyright Act allows 
the author to transfer and/or retain any of the exclusive rights pro­
vided under the Act,221 the moral right provided in the Visual Artists 
Rights Act belongs either to the author or to no one.222 This aspect of 
the moral right is foreign to Anglo-American property law, in which 
free alienability is a crucial concept. In addition, the droit moral de­
veloped out of a copyright tradition that focused primarily on the 
rights and interests of authors, and that was only secondarily con­
cerned with the public interest.223 It is difficult, if not impossible, to 
graft the natural law concept of moral rights onto existing American 
copyright law, with its emphasis on remuneration and free alienability. 
Recognition and protection of moral rights is incompatible with this 
primarily economic approach to copyright. 
CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, American copyright law will have to change. If 
American law currently provides the minimum protection for moral 
rights required by article 6bis of the Berne Convention, it does so only 
barely. Meanwhile, each revision of the Berne Convention since the 
introduction of moral rights has increased protection for these 
219. Id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.c. § 106A(d)(I». 
220. Paris Revision of 1971, supra note I, art. 6bis, para. 2. 
221. 17 U.S.c. § 201(d)(I) (1988). 
222. See supra note 185 and accompanying text. The only other right retained by 
the author in the 1976 Act is the right to terminate transfers. 17 U.S.C. § 203 (1988). 
223. See supra notes 29-90 and accompanying text. 
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rights. 224 The Berne Convention is also moving toward greater uni­
formity of protection among all member nations by raising the mini­
mum standard of protection required in a variety of areas.225 Given 
these trends, the current protection of moral rights under American 
law will not be adequate for compliance with the Berne Convention in 
the long run. 
The passage of state statutes protecting moral rights of visual art­
ists, and the Visual Artists Rights Act, even given its serious flaws, are 
steps in the right direction. Similar statutes protecting the moral 
rights of artists in other media are also necessary, however. What re­
ally must change is the view underlying American copyright law that 
intellectual property is completely analogous to real and personal 
property. Some scholars have argued that the lack of protection of 
moral rights in the United States reflects the low value Americans 
place on art itself.226 Real recognition of authors' moral rights re­
quires acknowledgement that an artist's product is different from that 
of a manufacturer in a fundamental way, which, in tum, requires that 
a society place a high value on art. If this is correct, perhaps the cur­
rent interest in moral rights on the part of scholars and legislatures 
indicates that change is underway. If such change continues, the 
United States may eventually provide the protection of moral rights 
that its avowed commitment to the Berne Convention requires. 
224. See supra notes 91-127 and accompanying text. 
225. See supra notes 91-127 and accompanying text. 
226. See, e.g., DaSilva, supra note 13, at 6. 
